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chapter 4
A Guide to Ground in Kant’s Lectures on
Metaphysics
Nicholas F. Stang
The Principle of Sufﬁcient Reason (PSR) says that everything has a reason
that fully explains it. Leibniz expresses the PSR in Latin and French,
respectively, as the principle that everything has a ratio or raison. When
German philosophers of the eighteenth century, heavily inﬂuenced by the
Leibnizian writings available to them, formulated similar ideas in their
native tongue, they translated ratio as Grund and expressed the PSR
accordingly as: Everything has a ground that fully explains it. This
Principle of Sufﬁcient Ground (Satz des zureichenden Grundes) or PSG
is, so to speak, the Leibnizian PSR translated into German. The PSG –
how to correctly formulate it, whether it holds without restriction –
became one of the major topics of debate within the Leibnizian tradition
of late eighteenth-century German philosophy, commonly known as
German rationalism.
It comes as no surprise then that Kant, steeped as he was in German
rationalism and its debates, would extensively discuss the PSG and the
notion of ground (Grund) in the metaphysics lectures he gave virtually
every semester at the University of Königsberg from 1755 until his retire-
ment from teaching in 1796.1 Nearly every extant transcript of those
lectures contains extended discussions of the correct deﬁnition of
“ground,” critical comments on the views of his near contemporaries
(especially those of Wolff, Baumgarten and Crusius) about what grounds
are, distinctions among different kinds of ground and considerations about
the correct formulation and range of application of the PSG.
While scholars have extensively discussed Kant’s treatment of the PSG
in the Antinomies chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason,2 and, more
1 For an overview of Kant’s lecture activity see Karl Ameriks’s and Steve Naragon’s Introduction to
(Kant 1997) and the website maintained by Naragon: http://users.manchester.edu/FacStaff/SSNara
gon/Kant/.
2 E.g., Heimsoeth (1966–71), Grier (2001), Longuenesse (2001), Boehm (2014), Boehm (2016).
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recently, his relation to German rationalist debates about it,3 relatively little
has been said about the exact notion of ground that ﬁgures in the PSG.
My aim in this chapter is to explain Kant’s discussion of ground in the
lectures and to relate it, where appropriate, to his published discussions of
ground.
I begin in Section I by discussing Wolff and Baumgarten’s deﬁnition of
<ground>4 (“that from which it can be understood why something is”),
Kant’s charge that this deﬁnition is circular and his own replacement
explication of this concept (that which when posited, something distinct
is posited). I argue that this version cannot serve, and Kant never intended
it to serve, as a deﬁnition of ground, but is merely an explication meant to
communicate the basic content of the concept to his audience. In Section
II, I consider various structural principles Kant accepts for the grounding
relation: It is irreﬂexive, transitive, asymmetric and determinate in one
direction only (i.e., grounds ground determinate consequences, but not
vice versa). In Section III, I explain various distinctions within the very
broad genus of grounding relations. The most important such distinction
is between epistemic grounding (α is a reason on the basis of which one can
know β) and explanatory grounding (α explains β). The focus of the rest of
the chapter will be on explanatory grounding. Another important distinc-
tion is between logical grounding (in which the grounding of β by α is fully
explained by the Principle of Non-Contradiction, or PNC) and real
grounding (in which the grounding relation cannot be so explained).
The logical grounding relation is a topic for logic, so in his metaphysics
lectures Kant devotes more attention to the real grounding relation, and
I will follow suit. Section IV concerns the species of real grounding to
which Kant devotes the most attention, namely, causation. I explain the
structure of the causal relation, why it is a real grounding relation and the
relationship between causation and several associated concepts: capacity
(Vermögen), force (Kraft), substance, accident and inherence. One might
think that causation is identical to real grounding, and there are passages in
the metaphysics lectures that appear to support this; however, I argue in
Section V that, in both the pre-Critical and the Critical period, Kant
accepts non-causal real grounding relations, paradigmatically in the cases
of God’s real grounding of real possibilities (pre-Critical) and the ground-
ing of the possibility of experience in synthetic a priori principles (Critical).
3 E.g., Hogan (2010), Fugate (2014a).
4 Italicized expressions within angle brackets refer to the concepts that would normally be expressed by
such an expression; e.g., <ground> refers to the concept expressed by “ground.”
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I survey the kinds of real non-causal grounding relations to which Kant is
committed and explicate their common structure. For reasons of space,
I do not explicitly discuss Kant’s attitude towards the PSG, but my hope is
that my explication of the notion of ground that ﬁgures in such a principle
will be of use to scholars engaged in that project. Likewise, rather than
discussing separately the views of Kant’s predecessors about ground,
I integrate references to the German rationalist background within the
discussion of Kant’s theory of ground.
A relation that goes by the name of “grounding” has recently become en
vogue in analytic metaphysics. Metaphysicians who talk about grounding
today typically have in mind a non-causal, non-logical relation of speciﬁ-
cally metaphysical explanation.5 For Kant and the German rationalists,
however, “ground” is a much more general notion, more akin to explana-
tion in general (or the worldly structure that “answers to” or “backs”
explanations).6 Kant and his contemporaries consider causes a species of
ground, while contemporary metaphysicians typically isolate the topic of
grounding by distinguishing it from causation.7 If contemporary ground-
ing corresponds to anything in eighteenth-century rationalism, it corre-
sponds to a species of grounding. The element of Kant’s theory to which it
corresponds most closely, I will argue, is the relation of non-causal real
grounding. Along the way, I attempt to substantiate that connection.
I. The Deﬁnition of Ground
Kant standardly begins his discussions of grounding by noting that
<ground> is a relational predicate: When we say that something is
a ground we are saying that it stands in a certain relation to something
else, namely, a consequence (Folge).8 One and the same thing can be both
a ground and a consequence. For instance, the falling of one domino is
5 For the recent revival of grounding in contemporary metaphysics see Fine (2001), Schaffer (2009),
Rosen (2010) and Audi (2012). Wilson (2014) questions whether grounding, as opposed to various
more speciﬁc determination relations, has earned its keep in metaphysics. An overview of the
subsequent debates is provided by Raven (2015) and Bliss and Trogdon (2014).
6 Cf. Raven (2015) on the distinction between what he calls “unionists” (who identify grounding with
metaphysical explanation (e.g. Rosen 2010) and “separatists” (who think of grounding as distinct
from but “backing” metaphysical explanation (e.g. Audi 2012).
7 E.g., Raven (2015, p. 325).
8 E.g. MVol, 28:401; MvS, 28: 486; ML2, 28:548; MDoh, 28:624. I take this to be an implicit criticism
of Baumgarten, who classes ground and consequence among the “universal internal predicates of
a being” (predicates that apply to all beings as such) rather than the “relative predicates of a being”
(predicates that apply to beings in virtue of their relations to other beings), where, from Kant’s point
of view, they would seem to belong.
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a consequence of the previous domino’s falling, and is the ground of the
next domino falling; one proposition can be the ground of another, as well
as a consequence of yet another proposition, and so on. Thus, it is more
perspicuous to talk about a grounding relation (α grounds β) and to deﬁne
ground and consequence in terms of this relation. For any α, α is a ground
just in case there is a β that α grounds; for any α, α is a consequence just in
case there is a γ that grounds α. In what follows α→g β will mean that α
grounds β.9,10
However, this only tells us something about the logic of the relational
predicates <ground> and <consequence>; it tells us neither what grounds are,
nor what the relation of grounding is. Many philosophers in the late
rationalist tradition attempted to deﬁne ground, none more famously
than Christian Wolff: “The ground is that through which one can under-
stand why something is.”11 Baumgarten gives a similar deﬁnition:
“A Ground (ratio) is that from which it is knowable [cognoscibile] why
[cur] something is.”12 Commenting on Baumgarten’s deﬁnition in the
Herder metaphysics lectures, Kant claims that this deﬁnition is circular:
“The author’s deﬁnition is unacceptable because of the word ‘why’ [cur],
which just means ‘from what ground.’ It is thus a concealed circle” (MH,
28:11). Kant makes the same point repeatedly in later lectures.13
It is worth unpacking his reasoning here. The notion of ground in
German rationalism is, very broadly, an explanatory notion. A ground
explains what it grounds; to explain something is to know its ground. But
grounding is not one explanatory relation among others; rather, it is the
most general explanatory notion of all. Any successful explanation must
cite a ground of the explanandum.14Consequently, there is nomore general
notion to which “why” in the Wolff-Baumgarten deﬁnition can refer; it
must refer to the ground of the relevant item. Consequently, the Wolff-
9 One might immediately want to know what the relata of the grounding relation are. However, the
relata of grounding depend on the species of grounding relation in question (e.g. causation relates
substances to accidents, while logical grounding relates concepts to concepts), so until we distin-
guish the different species of grounding relation we will have to prescind from a precise speciﬁcation
of the relata. Consequently, I use Greek letters as ‘meta-variables’ that will have to be ﬁlled in later
with variables of the appropriate syntactic category (e.g. objectual variables, propositional variables).
10 In some contemporary work, grounding is represented not as a relation but as an operator on sets of
sentences, e.g. Fine (2012). To facilitate comparison with the eighteenth century, though, I will
focus on contemporary theories that express grounding through a relation.
11 Wolff (1719, §29). 12 M, 1757, §14.
13 E.g. MVol, 28:401; MvS, 28:486; MDoh, 28:624. Even earlier, it is in Kant’s New Elucidation, AA,
1:393.
14 Contrast this with contemporary theories, in which grounding explanations (or explanation-
backing relations; see note 5) are one species of explanation alongside others (e.g. causal
explanations).
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Baumgarten deﬁnition of ground is circular; the very notion of ground
implicitly ﬁgures in the deﬁniens.15
A few lines later, Kant offers a replacement “deﬁnition” of ground:
“A ground is therefore something which, if it is posited (posito), something
else is posited (ponitur)” (MH, 28:11).16 This principle is repeated in many
later lectures, including those from the Critical period.17 Kant’s basic idea
is this: (α→g β) if and only if, if α is “posited” then β is “posited.”
But what does “posited” mean here? In BDG, a text published around
the time the Herder lectures were delivered,18 Kant explains this notion as
follows:
The concept of positing [Position] or setting [Setzung] is perfectly simple: it
is identical with the concept of being in general. Now something can be
thought as posited merely relatively, or to express the matter better, it can be
thought merely as the relation (respectus logicus) of something as
a characteristic mark of a thing. In this case, being, that is to say, the
positing of this relation, is nothing other than the copula in a judgment.
If what is considered is not merely the relation but the thing posited in and
for itself, then this being is the same as existence. (BDG, 2:73)
Relative positing is judging: that is, it is the positing of a logical relation
between two predicates; the predicate falls under the concept. Absolute
positing is the positing of an object for a given concept: that is, it is judging
that the concept is instantiated.19
Applying this back to Kant’s claim about grounding, we can distinguish
two kinds of grounding relation with two kinds of relata: propositional
grounding (if one proposition is posited, another is posited, its conse-
quence) and objectual grounding (if the existence of one object is posited,
the existence of another, its consequence, is posited).20 In each case,
however, the question remains of what connection Kant is asserting
between these two positings.
15 Longuenesse (2001, p. 7) considers a response on Wolff’s behalf.
16 “Ein Grund ist also aliquid, quo posito, ponitur aliud.”
17 In addition to MH, 28:11, 13, it also appears in: MvS, 28:486; ML2, 28:548; MDoh, 28:624; and
MMron, 29:806, 808. For the relation between this deﬁnition of <ground>, and Kant’s deﬁnition at
ND, 1:391, see Melamedoff (Manuscript).
18 On its title page, BDG lists 1763 as its date of publication, but as David Walford and Ralf Meerbote
point out in their Introduction to Kant (1992) it actually appeared late in 1762. The Herder
transcripts are an amalgam of lectures Kant gave during the period 1762–4.
19 Cf. the discussions of this passage in Abaci (2008) and Stang (2016).
20 In fact, if we include “mixed” cases we can distinguish at least two more kinds: object-proposition
grounding (x !g p) and proposition-object ground (p !g x). What I am calling propositional
grounding is, in this period, usually treated as a relation between predicates. To see how predicate
grounding can be translated into propositional grounding, see Stang (2016, p. 19).
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There are at least four such relations Kant might have in mind:
i) Mere conditional. The most ﬂat-footed reading, in the objectual
case, would be: x grounds y just in case if x exists then y exists
(propositionally, if p then q). The problem with this is that it entails
that any two existing objects ground one another (or that any true
proposition grounds any other true proposition). This reading
requires no explanatory connection between x and y, and thus is
untenable as an account of grounding.21
ii) Logical entailment. The relation between the positing of the ground
and the positing of the consequence might be a relation of logical
entailment. However, we can quickly reject this as an interpretation
of Kant’s account of grounding, because it is a central part of his
theory of ground from at least the mid-1760s (when the Herder
lectures were given) onwards that there are non-logical “real” grounds
that “posit” their consequences without logically entailing them.
I discuss the distinction between real and logical grounding in the
Section III below.
iii) Strict conditional. If the connection between ground and consequence
is not logical entailment, perhaps it is a non-logical necessary connection:
Grounds necessitate their consequences. Precisely how we formulate this
will depend on the relata of the grounding relation:
iii.a) Propositional: p→g q = □ (p→ q).
iii.b) Objectual: x→g y = □ (x exists→ y exists).
22,23
However, neither proposal is tenable. Where q is necessarily true, the right
half of (iii.a) is satisﬁed for any p. Thus, (iii.a) would entail that every
21 It has the further ﬂaw of entailing that grounding is reﬂexive and not anti-symmetric, which, as I will
argue in section II, Kant denies.
22 (iii.a) and (iii.b) are formulated as biconditionals. Does Kant accept the left-to-right side of the
biconditional, the claim that grounds necessitate their consequences? This is hard to answer in
general, for he accepts multiple kinds of grounding relations (see section III), but there is (defeasible)
evidence that he does: “The ground is that from which something follows entirely necessarily”
(ML2, 28:548).
23 How to express properly the right-hand side of (iii.b) depends on the appropriate logical form for
existential judgments. Given Kant’s doctrine that existence is absolute, not relative positing, the
appropriate form is arguably not that of a predicate applied to an object (e.g. “x exists”). However, if
we formulate the existential judgments on the right-hand side in a way more appropriate to Kant’s
theory of existence (e.g. as ∃xFx) this would make (iii.b) unsuitable for expressing grounding
relations between objects (for the variables bound by the existential quantiﬁer must be different
from the variables on the left-hand side). For the sake of brevity, I will ignore this complication. For
more on the logical form of Kantian existential judgments see Abaci (2008), Rosenkoetter (2010)
and Stang (2016).
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necessarily true proposition is grounded (i.e. explained) by every other
proposition, including contingent ones. Likewise, where y is a necessary
being, y satisﬁes the right-hand side of (iii.b) for any x. Thus, (iii.b) would
entail that every object grounds the existence of God. But either conclusion
would be rejected by Kant or any German rationalist, since God cannot
have a ground distinct from himself.24
iv) Efﬁcient causation. One might try to read the connection between
ground and consequence as a causal notion, but this is unacceptable as
well. First of all, Kant deﬁnes causation as a species of grounding;25
consequently, causation cannot be used in the deﬁnition of grounding
itself, on pain of circularity.26 Secondly, as we will see, Kant at every
period in his career wants to allow for the possibility of non-causal
grounding; causation is a species of grounding, but not the only one.
Building a causal requirement into the very deﬁnition of ground
would defeat that.
If I am right that grounding cannot be non-circularly analyzed in more
basic terms, then Kant’s “deﬁnition” of ground is, by his own lights, not
a deﬁnition. A deﬁnition, Kant insists in his lectures on logic, not only
must be non-circular but must also analyze the concept into marks that are
more clearly understood than the concept itself.27 The failure of the four
candidate analyses above suggests that this will not be possible in the case of
<grounding> or <positing> (assuming that the material conditional, logical
entailment, the strict conditional and causation are more clearly under-
stood than grounding).28 Kant himself at one point admits this about his
“deﬁnition” of grounding: “The ground is that through which something
distinct is posited [gesetzt wird]; this is not yet the deﬁnition of ground, but
rather only as much as I can ﬁnd through the ﬁrst analysis of my concept”
(MVol, 28:401). His “deﬁnition” of grounding should be compared with
what he says about existence in BDG around the same time:
Once it is appreciated that the whole of our cognition ultimately resolves
itself into unanalyzable concepts, it will also be understood that there will be
24 I shall argue in section II that Kant rejects self-grounding and thus consistently denies that God has
any ground whatsoever.
25 See section IV.
26 Although the dominant view in the lectures is that causation is a species of grounding, there is at
least one text where Kant says the opposite (ML2, 28:548).
27 LBlom 24:265; LDoh, 24:759); LWien, 24:924.
28 As we shall see in section IV, Kant himself would not admit that causation is more clearly under-
stood than grounding, for causation is a species of grounding.
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some concepts which are almost unanalyzable; in other words, there will be
some concepts where the characteristic marks are only to a very small degree
clearer and simpler than the thing itself. Such is the case with our deﬁnition
of existence [as absolute positing–NS]. (BDG, 2:73)
Neither Kant’s remarks on existence nor his “deﬁnition” of ground are
proper deﬁnitions of these concepts in terms of more basic and more
clearly understood constituents. Each of them “analyzes” the target con-
cept in terms of a concept not signiﬁcantly clearer than the original
(absolute positing, the positing of one thing by another). These “analyses”
are more akin to informal explications of these concepts, by which Kant
indicates to his audience how he understands the target concept, how he
distinguishes his view from others (e.g. existence is not a real predicate,
grounding is not in general logical grounding) and how he draws semi-
deﬁnitional connections between concepts (whatever absolute positing is,
the absolute positing of a ground absolutely posits its consequence).
II. Structural Principles of Grounding
In this section I discuss several structural features of grounding. Typically,
Kant simply makes the unqualiﬁed claim that these structural features hold
of grounds and consequences (e.g. that nothing grounds itself). Since he
also accepts several different species of grounding relations (the topic of
Section III), this opens the possibility that these features hold only of some
grounding relations and not of others. However, my guiding hypothesis
will be that the prima facie meaning of Kant’s claims is the correct one:
These structural features apply to all grounding relations as such.
(a) Irreﬂexive
In the Nova Dilucidatio of 1755, one of Kant’s ﬁrst published works in
metaphysics, he argues that nothing can “contain” its own ground (PND,
1:394).29 Kant uses this claim to object to the ontological argument: God’s
essence or complete concept cannot contain existence because nothing can
contain the ground of its own existence.30 In his lectures on metaphysics,
Kant repeatedly makes a related but subtly different claim: Nothing
29 Melamedoff (Manuscript) considers whether Kant’s view of ground in ND (as well as Wolff’s view)
might allow some violations of irreﬂexivity.
30 He also makes a more familiar objection: The ontological arguments shows only a connection
between God and existence “in ideas” (PND, 1:394–5), not in reality. See Longuenesse (2001) and
Melamedoff (Manuscript) for reconstructions of this argument.
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grounds itself.31 Following contemporary parlance, I will refer to this as the
irreﬂexivity of grounding:
Irreﬂexivity: For all α, ~(α→g α).
32
Kant sometimes cites the irreﬂexivity of grounding as the reason why
ontological arguments fail,33 but it is signiﬁcantly less clear why proponents
of ontological arguments are committed to rejecting that principle.
Baumgarten and Wolff, for instance, claim that God’s existence is
grounded in his essence; that is, in his possibility.34 They do not, to my
knowledge, claim anything that would violate irreﬂexivity strictly speaking
(e.g. that God→g God, or that God exists→g God exists). I suspect that,
contra Kant, denying irreﬂexivity is not a crucial commitment of the
ontological argument, but I do not have the space to argue the point here.35
(b) Transitive
Kant also endorses the transitivity of grounding:
Transitivity: For all α, β, and γ, if α→g β and β→g γ, then α→g γ.
36
Though he does not typically come straight out and say that grounding is
a transitive relation, his commitment to the transitivity of grounding
becomes clear in his distinction between mediate and immediate
grounds.37 A mediate ground α of some thing γ is a ground of a ground
of γ. An immediate ground of γ is something that grounds γ but not in
virtue of grounding some third thing, that is, an intermediary. That Kant
considers mediate grounds of a thing to be grounds of that thing shows that
he assumes that grounding is transitive. This is especially clear in
Volckmann:
31 MH, 28:13, 54; MvS, 28:486); MDoh, 28:625; MMron, 29:813. Note that Kant endorses the
irreﬂexivity of grounding even for logical grounding (MDoh, 28:625); so p never grounds p, even
though (trivially) p entails p.
32 This principle is granted by most contemporary grounding theorists; see Jenkins (2011) and Correia
(2014) for dissenting views.
33 MvS, 28:486. 34 M, §820; Wolff (1719, §929–30).
35 Elsewhere I meticulously reconstruct the ontological arguments of Descartes, Leibniz and
Baumgarten (see Stang 2016). None of those arguments, at least as I reconstruct them, requires
the denial of irreﬂexivity in order to be valid.
36 Baumgarten agrees: see M, §25. Likewise, most contemporary theorists endorse transitivity. Tahko
(2013) and Litland (2013) consider counterexamples to transitivity, while Schaffer (2012) marshals
a “contrastive” theory of grounding in response to such apparent counterexamples.
37 MVol, 28:409; MvS, 28:490; ML2, 28:551; MDoh, 28:627; MMron, 29:817.
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Ground is divided into the mediate and the immediate. The former is
a ground of the ground of a thing (Sache), e.g., A is the ground of B, and
this is the ground of C, so A is the ground of a ground and is called the
mediate ground [of C – NS]. An immediate ground has no intermediate
ground (Zwischengrund). (MVol, 28:409)
This is a clear endorsement of the transitivity of grounding.
(c) Asymmetry
Asymmetry and transitivity entail that grounding is asymmetric:
Asymmetry: for all α and β, if α→g β then ~(β→g α).
38
One potential source of counterexamples to the asymmetry of grounding is
cases of mutual causal interaction between substances. I argue in Section
III that this is not a genuine counterexample to asymmetry, because
substances ground one another’s accidents, not one another.
(d) Determinacy
A ground is that which, when posited, something else, namely, its con-
sequence, is also posited. This was Kant’s explication of “ground” from
Section I. But since every consequence by deﬁnition has a ground, the same
principle applies to it: If you posit the consequence, a ground is also
posited. In order to introduce the necessary asymmetry into the grounding
relation, Kant points out that grounds posit a determinate consequence,
while consequences posit some ground or other indeterminately.39 To take
Kant’s preferred example, a cause posits a speciﬁc effect; for example, the
falling of domino n causes domino n+1 to fall. But if domino n+1 falls, all
that follows is that some domino or other caused it to fall; it need not be
determinately the case that domino n caused it.
Determinacy: if α→g β then (i) if α is posited then β is posited, but (ii) if β
is posited then some ground γ of β is posited (for some γ, γ→g β).
40
38 If α grounds β, and β grounds α, then by transitivity, α grounds α, which violates irreﬂexivity. QED.
39 MVol, 28:401, 408; ML2, 28:548; MDoh, 28:624, 628; MMron, 29:808, 818.
40 This issue is obviously related to the PSG, for otherwise why cannot γ be posited without a ground?
That Kant takes consequences to indeterminately posit grounds means that he is assuming the PSG
for things that are consequences: If γ is a consequence (i.e. is grounded), then necessarily if γ is
posited then it is a consequence (i.e. is grounded). In other words, things that are grounded are
necessarily grounded (though not necessarily by their actual grounds).
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The primary reason why Kant accepts the indeterminacy of the relation of
consequences to their grounds is causal preemption, when the ordinary
cause of an effect is “preempted” by some non-standard cause. For
instance, I might preempt the causal role of domino n by pushing over
domino n+1 myself. Determinacy is meant to capture the more general
possibility of “grounding” preemption. Some care is required here, for as
we will see below, in some kinds of grounding relation, consequences
require determinate grounds; that is, if a certain consequence is present
then only a determinate ground could have grounded it. These kinds of
grounding will not allow for preemption. The clearest case is God: Since
only God can ground the total space of real possibility, if the total space of
real possibility is posited, thenGod is posited. So the determinacy principle
holds for these kinds of grounding relation, but an additional clause (iii)
holds: the γ that grounds β is α.
(e) Nexus
“Nexus” does not, sensu stricto, refer to a structural feature of the
grounding relation like irreﬂexivity or transitivity. It is a term that
Kant picks up from the German rationalist tradition, which he under-
stands much the way Baumgarten does: “The nexus is the predicate by
virtue of which something is either ground or consequence.”41 This is
not exactly pellucid, but I take it to mean that “nexus” refers to the
relation of standing in some grounding relation in which it is indifferent
which relatum is the ground and which the consequence. Kant more
frequently speaks of items being in nexu, by which I take him to mean: α
and β are in nexu just in case they are related by some chain of ground-
consequence relations.42,43
Baumgarten sometimes speaks of different nexuses in the world, distin-
guished by the nature of the underlying ground-consequence relation; he
speaks of the logical nexus, as well as the nexus of efﬁcient causes and
consequences, the nexus of ﬁnal causes and consequences, and others.44
41 M, §14. Kant discusses nexus in: MH, 28:12, 24, 25, 32, 52, 82, 103, 129; ML1 28: 196; MVol, 28:402;
MvS, 28: 487; MDoh, 28:627, 648, 657, 665; MK2, 28:719, 800; MMron, 29:806, 810, 816, 826, 845,
846, 851, 867.
42 MH, 28:18, 28, 32, 39, 77, 103, 129, 138, 139; ML1, 28:195, 212, 214, 324; MVol, 28:407; MvS, 28:488–9;
MDoh, 28:648; MK3, 28:827; MNH, 28:936; MMron, 29:806, 812, 847, 935.
43 In contemporary terms, we might take the nexus of α to be the transitive closure of some grounding
relation with respect to α.
44 M, §358. Baumgarten’s complete list of nexuses is: the efﬁcient nexus, the nexus of utility, the ﬁnal
nexus, the subjective and formal nexus and the nexus of signiﬁcation.
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Kant sometimes uses the same terminology (in one passage even making all
of the distinctions that Baumgarten does).45 Once we have distinguished
different kinds of grounding relation, we will be able to distinguish
different kinds of nexus. For instance, the causal nexus of an item (sub-
stance or accident) will be the complete set of substances and accidents to
which it is causally related, either as cause (ground) or effect (consequence),
no matter how mediately.
III. Distinctions in Ground
“Ground,” as we have seen, is a very broad notion in German rational-
ism. In this section I discuss various distinctions among kinds of ground
that Kant makes in his lectures. In many cases, he is drawing on a set of
distinctions that would be familiar to readers of eighteenth-century
metaphysics, but sometimes he uses his own distinctive terminology.
Where appropriate, I explain the historical provenance of Kant’s
distinctions.
(a) Complete vs. Partial Ground
I have been implicitly restricting attention to grounds that sufﬁce to
posit their consequences, but Kant distinguishes between such grounds,
which he calls “sufﬁcient” grounds, and “insufﬁcient” grounds.46 Kant
also draws this distinction in mereological terms: A sufﬁcient ground is
a “complete” ground, and an insufﬁcient ground is an “incomplete”
ground, a proper part of a complete, i.e. sufﬁcient, ground. A partial
ground fails to satisfy Kant’s “positing” condition on grounds, for if α is
only a partial ground of β, then positing α by itself does not sufﬁce for
the positing of β, since the other components that make up a complete
ground of β might be lacking. This means that partial grounds are not,
strictly speaking, grounds, according to Kant’s own explication of
<ground>. I think we should read Kant as deﬁning partial grounding
in terms of grounding simpliciter, which he identiﬁes with complete
grounding.
Deﬁnition: α is a complete ground of β if and only if α→g β.
45 MDoh, 28:649–50; for the reiﬁed use of “nexus” see MMron, 29:826, 851.
46 MvS, 28:490, and MMron, 29:817.
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Deﬁnition: α is a partial ground of β just in case α is a proper part of some
γ such that γ→g β.
47,48
Consequently, there is no room in Kant’s theory for a ground that is
complete but is insufﬁcient to ground its consequence. In other words, if
some ground α is insufﬁcient to posit the consequence β, this is because α
must be supplemented by some further element which will constitute
a complete ground of β.49
(b) Coordinate vs. Subordinate Grounds
Kant also distinguishes between coordinate and subordinate grounds.50
This is not so much a distinction between kinds of grounding relations,
but rather a distinction between how grounds are situated within
a larger structure of grounding relations. Coordinated grounds of
a given thing are grounds of that thing which do not stand in grounding
relations to one another; subordinated grounds of a thing are grounds
that do stand in such relations. This means that the partial grounds that
constitute the complete ground of a given consequence are coordinated
grounds.51 To use a previous example, dominos 1 through n are sub-
ordinate grounds of the falling of domino n+1; by transitivity, each
domino in that series is a ground of domino n+1 falling and a ground
of the next domino in the series. By contrast, the individual parts of
domino n are coordinated grounds of the falling of domino n+1; they do
not ground one another. The coordinate/subordinate and the complete/
partial distinctions crosscut one another. The lower third and upper
third of domino n are coordinated partial grounds of domino n+1
47 Kant is following Baumgarten’s lead here. In M, §21, Baumgarten distinguishes between sufﬁcient
grounds, which he identiﬁes with complete grounds, and insufﬁcient grounds, which he identiﬁes
with partial grounds.
48 The distinction between complete and partial grounds is also present in the contemporary literature:
see Rosen (2010) and Fine (2012). However, the typical contemporary view of the relation between
partial and complete grounds is set-theoretic rather than mereological: A partial ground is a proper
subset of a set of complete grounds.
49 This means that probabilistic grounding (e.g. probabilistic causation) is strictly speaking not
possible, according to Kant. He does discuss chance and probability (Wahrscheinlichkeit) at several
points, but he has an epistemic or “subjective” conception of chance on which it is ultimately
a matter of our incomplete evidence; there is no “objective” chance in the world, according to Kant.
See LBlom, 24:143; LPhil, 24:436); LPöl, 24:554; VDoh, 24:742; LWien, 24:879.
50 MH, 28:14, 29; MVol, 28: 402, 410; MvS 28:491; ML2, 28:548; MDoh, 28:628, 648; MMron, 29:817.
Cf. A412/B439
51 MH, 28:14; MvS, 28:491.
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falling, and the lower halves of dominos 1 through n are subordinated
partial grounds of domino n+1 falling.52
(c) Explanatory vs. Epistemic Grounds
These ﬁrst two distinctions were structural distinctions among roles that
grounds play in systems of grounding relations. By contrast, the most basic
substantive distinction among kinds of ground themselves is between what
I will call explanatory grounds and epistemic grounds.53Nearly every writer in
this period draws a corresponding distinction, but they use different
terminology (which is then sometimes taken up by later writers to draw
a slightly different distinction), which can be confusing.54 The basic dis-
tinction is between a ground that explains why something is the case and
a ground that gives one reason to believe (or be in some other epistemic
state with respect to the proposition) that something is the case. For
example, the ﬁre explains why there is smoke, but the presence of the
smoke is reason to infer the existence of the ﬁre. To avoid confusion, I will
use the term “explanatory ground” to refer to the former, and “epistemic
ground” to refer to the latter. But one and the same thing can be both an
explanatory and an epistemic ground. The ﬁre explains why there is smoke
but one can also infer from the fact that there is a ﬁre that there will be
smoke.55 So we should think of this instead as a distinction between two
kinds of relation: an explanatory relation and an epistemic relation.
As always, talk of grounds (and consequences) will be shorthand for talk
of things insofar as they stand in appropriate grounding relations (an
52 Kant is also borrowing this distinction from Baumgarten; see M, §28.
53 MH, 28:12, 37, 54; MVol, 28:355, 400; MDoh, 28:647; MK2, 28:724; MMron, 29:806.
In some texts (e.g., MK2, 28:724) Kant expresses this as a tripartite distinction between
ratio essendi, ratio ﬁendi and ratio cognoscendi (see section IV for a discussion of the ﬁrst two),
but this constitutes a distinction between what I am calling “explanatory” grounds (ratio
essendi, ratio ﬁendi) on the one hand, and an epistemic ground (ratio cognoscendi) on the
other.
54 For instance, Crusius distinguishes between “real” and “ideal” grounds, which roughly corresponds
to my distinction between explanatory and epistemic grounds; see Crusius (1747, §139); Crusius
(1745, §34–5). Kant partially borrows this terminology in his distinction between real and logical
grounds, but as he himself notes (MH, 28:12, 37), uses this terminology to draw a totally different
distinction. Crusius himself borrowed the “real” and “ideal” distinction from Leibniz and
Baumgarten; see Leibniz (1990, §66), and M, §212.
55 Kant’s distinction between “antecedently determining” and “consequentially determining
grounds” in PND, 1:392–3, is unsatisfactory because, contra Kant, it does not track the
explanatory/epistemic distinction. The ﬁre is the antecedently determining ground and not
the consequentially determining ground of the smoke, but it can be a ground of knowing that
there is smoke.
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explanatory ground is something that bears the explanatory grounding
relation to something, etc.).
As some readers will have noted, there is a tension between my
characterization of the explanatory/epistemic distinction as a distinction
between kinds of grounds, and my introductory description of <ground>
as the most general concept of explanation in German rationalism.
It might seem that I have “deﬁned away” epistemic grounding from the
outset. But notice that Kant’s own explication of <ground> seems not to
apply to epistemic grounds at all: “A ground is something which, if it is
posited [posito], something else is posited [ponitur]” (MH, 28:11). Nor
does Wolff’s deﬁnition of ground: “The ground is that through which one
can understand why something is.”56 We could stretch Kant’s explication
to ﬁt epistemic grounds as follows: When I come to know that p on the
basis of epistemic ground g, the “positing” of my grasp of g “posits” my
knowledge that p. Slightly less artiﬁcially, Wolff’s deﬁnition could be
extended as follows: Epistemic ground g explains why my belief that p is
knowledge that p. We face an interpretive choice here, I think. Either we
can insist that <ground> really is a unitary concept, and try to understand
it in terms general enough that it can encompass two species, which I have
called explanatory and epistemic grounds; or we can give up on the unity
of the concept <ground> and think of it as a disjunctive concept subsum-
ing two very different relations, namely, the relation between an expla-
nandum and its explanans, and the relation between knowledge and the
evidence on which it based.57 I will not make that interpretive choice here.
Because this chapter is concerned with grounding in Kant’s lectures on
metaphysics, I will focus on the explanatory relation. Before we bid adieu
to epistemic grounding, though, I want to note that it is plausible that the
structural principles of grounding in general apply to it: It is irreﬂexive,
transitive and asymmetric. What’s more, we can distinguish between
complete and partial epistemic grounds (a complete body of evidence
and its individual components) and between subordinated and coordi-
nated epistemic grounds (e.g. the premises in an argument are coordi-
nated, while successive steps in a deduction are subordinated). Thus,
I take it that these ﬁrst three distinctions crosscut one another.58
56 1719, §29.
57 The closest contemporary analogue to the epistemic grounding relation is the relation of “epistemic
basing.” See Korcz (2015) for an overview.
58 For a different take on what I am calling the epistemic/explanatory distinction, see Melamedoff
(Manuscript).
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(d) Real vs. Logical Grounds
The second main division in Kant’s theory of grounds is between real and
logical grounds. Whereas many of the previous distinctions are standard
within German rationalism, Kant’s distinction between real and logical
grounds constitutes a signiﬁcant break with that tradition, which, accord-
ing to Kant, conﬂated these two kinds of ground.59 While a related
distinction is made by Crusius, what Kant does with this distinction,
especially in the Critical period, goes signiﬁcantly beyond Crusius.60
Thus, in talking about the logical ground/real ground distinction we can
be said to be entering for the ﬁrst time into the distinctively Kantian theory
of grounds.
The distinction between logical and real grounds is present in theHerder
transcripts, the ﬁrst set of metaphysics lectures we have:
Every ground is either logical, through which the consequence, which is
posited by the law of identity [per regulam identitatis] as one [einerlei] with
the ground, as a predicate; or the ground is real, through which the
consequence is not posited by the law of identity [per regulam identitatis]
and is not one [einerlei] with the ground. (MH, 28:11)
This distinction is maintained throughout Kant’s writings from this point
on, and recurs throughout his lectures on metaphysics.61
The distinction is ultimately a distinction in the relation (nexus) between
a ground and its consequence. A logical ground is one that “posits” its
consequence by purely logical principles (identity, non-contradiction).
I take this to mean that the explanation of why, given the ground, the
consequence must be posited, is purely logical.62 The paradigmatic exam-
ple of a logical ground is the relation between a concept and a mark of the
concept, e.g. <human> and <fallibility>: That <human> is a logical ground
of <fallibility> means that any object, in virtue of falling under <human>,
also falls under <fallible>. To apply Kant’s own explication, to posit an
object under <human> is thereby to posit it under <fallible>.63 This is
59 I elsewhere reconstruct what I call the “logicist” conception of ground (according to which all
grounds are logical grounds) and Kant’s critique of it in (see Stang 2016, 82–91).
60 As Kant himself notes: see MH, 28:12, 37. Cf. Hogan (2010).
61 MH, 28:11–12, 24–5, 32; MVol, 28:402; MvS, 28:486; ML2, 28:548; MDoh, 28:625; MNH, 28:843–4;
MMron, 29:807, 808, 810, 812, 820.
62 Thus, on my reading, the distinction between real and logical grounds is ultimately a distinction in
what grounds the grounding relation itself: the principle of non-contradiction (logical grounds) or
something else.
63 The same point applies to relative positing (see above): the judgment that A is human contradicts the
judgment ~(A is fallible).
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logical grounding because if an object were posited under <human> but
not under <fallible> then a contradiction would result: Something would
be A & B, but also ~B.
The deﬁnition of a real grounding is deceptively simple: α is a real
ground of β just in case α grounds β but α is not a logical ground of β. This
is informative only to the extent that we have a grasp on what the
grounding relation in general is. Since Kant does not give a reductive
analysis of that relation, we cannot give a reductive analysis of <real
ground>. Consequently, we must acquire our understanding of this notion
from its role in Kant’s theory and its systematic interconnections with
other notions. I will therefore postpone further discussion of real grounds
until we have turned to a consideration of various kinds of real ground in
Kant’s system, most importantly, causation.
(e) Ground of Being vs. Ground of Becoming
Finally, Kant borrows from Baumgarten the distinction between the
ground of being (ratio essendi) and the ground of becoming (ratio
ﬁendi).64 In Mrongovius he explains the distinction as follows:
Ratio essendi is the ground of that which belongs to a thing according to its
possibility, e.g., the three sides in the triangle are the ground of the three
corners. Here I speak merely of a possible triangle; considered in actuality,
e.g., the ink and quill are the ratio ﬁendi of the triangle, and ratio ﬁendi is
cause. (MMron, 29:809)
A ratio essendi is a ground of the possible being of a thing, while a ratio
ﬁendi is a ground of its actual existence. Merely possible beings, or beings
considered solely qua possible (e.g. Kant’s merely possible triangle), possess
a ground of being but lack a ground of becoming. The concretely existing
triangle, a shape or physical ﬁgure, will possess a ground of becoming, that
is, a cause that brought it into existence: Kant identiﬁes the ground of
becoming with the cause, a point to which I will turn in Section IV. He
holds that all causes are real grounds, but in Section V I will argue that
some grounds of possibility are real grounds as well, so he accepts real
grounding relations that are not causal relations.
64 M, §311; Kant discusses the distinction in MH, 28:36, 54; MvS, 28:523; ML2, 28:571; MDoh, 28:647;
MK2, 28:724; MMron, 29:809, 844. In fact, Baumgarten’s original distinction, retained in some of
Kant’s lectures, is tripartite, between the ratio essendi, the ratio ﬁendi and the ratio cognoscendi.
However, as I explained in note 53, I think the ﬁrst two are explanatory grounds, as opposed to the
epistemic ratio cognoscendi. I therefore discuss them separately.
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IV. Causation
In this section I discuss the real grounding relation about which Kant has
the most to say in his lectures and in his published work, namely causation.
(a) Causation as a Species of Real Grounding
Consider Kant’s deﬁnition of <cause> inMrongovius: “That which contains
the ground of the existence [Dasein] of something, is the cause” (MMron,
29:843).65 More speciﬁcally, a cause is a real ground. Already in the Herder
transcripts Kant holds that causation is a real grounding relation, and he
maintains this view throughout every set of lectures we have. His claim that
causation is not a logical grounding relation amounts to this: The nexus
between a real ground and its consequence is not explained by the principle
of contradiction. No logical analysis, even if we were logically omniscient,
of the concept of, say, ﬁre (<ﬁre>), would explain why objects that
instantiate this concept cause the existence of smoke. This does not
mean merely that <causes smoke> is not a mark of <ﬁre>. While that may
not in fact be a mark of that concept, Kant’s point does not hinge on this.
We can surely coin a new concept <ﬁre+> that includes this mark (in Kant’s
later Critical terminology, it is analytic that ﬁre+ causes smoke), but if we
do so we will merely have included a causal relation among the marks of
a concept; we will not, however, have explained that causal relation. In fact,
it is arguably the causal relation that explains the conceptual connection:
It is because ﬁre causes smoke that it falls under <ﬁre+>, the concept that
contains <causes smoke> among its marks. Thus, while <ﬁre+> contains
<causes smoke>, the causal connection between ﬁre and smoke is neither
identical nor reducible to that conceptual connection.66
Kant’s point is deceptively simple but quite important. The model of
logical grounding I sketched above is one in which a single object’s falling
under a concept explains why that very same object falls under a different
concept (a mark of the ﬁrst). This is why Kant emphasizes that a logical
ground is a ground of a predicate in one and the same object (see the passage
quoted from the Herder transcripts above). This is why the nexus between
a logical ground and its consequence is explicable via the principle of
contradiction: A contradiction would arise if an object fell under the
whole concept but not the mark. It provides no model for explaining
65 Cf. ML2, 28:549; MMron, 29:808.
66 Kant gives an argument to this effect in NG, 2:202), which I reconstruct elsewhere (Stang 2016,
pp. 88–9).
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why the existence of one object (or the properties of that object) explains
the existence or the properties of another object. This is crucial, since Kant
deﬁnes a cause as the ground of the existence of something distinct:
“A cause is that from which the existence (Existenz) of another follows”
(MMron, 29:808).67 Thus, logical grounding provides no way of account-
ing for an efﬁcient causal relation where one object explains why
a numerically distinct object has a given property, for instance (to use
one of many sun-related examples in Kant’s lectures), why the sun shining
explains why the stone is warm. Since causes are grounds, theymust be real,
non-logical grounds.
(b) Kant’s Model of Causation as Grounding
Throughout his lectures on metaphysics, Kant articulates a more detailed
conception of the grounding structure of causation. I will follow Kant and
focus on the case of causation among ﬁnite things (the model would have
to be amended slightly to account for divine creation of ﬁnite things).
I have prescinded up to this point from precisely specifying the relata of
grounding relations, because those relata differ, depending on which
grounding relation is under discussion: Logical grounding is between
concepts, while real grounding is between things. But in the case of (ﬁnite)
causal grounding we can be quite speciﬁc: Causal grounds (causes) are
substances, and causal consequences (effects) are accidents.68 A substance,
insofar as it grounds not the actual existence of an accident but its real
possibility, is said to possess a capacity (Vermögen).69 Substances have both
passive capacities (capacities to be altered by substances) and active capa-
cities (capacities to alter substances). A substance, insofar as it causally
grounds the actual existence of an accident, is said to have force (Kraft).
Kant adamantly, and repeatedly, rejects Baumgarten’s deﬁnition of force as
that which grounds the existence of an accident.70 This identiﬁes forces
with substances, but according to Kant forces are not identical to sub-
stances; rather, a force is a relation (respectus) that a substance bears to the
accidents whose existence it causes.71 A substance that does not ground the
67 Cf. A243/B301: “From the concept of a cause as a pure category [. . .] I will not ﬁnd out anything
more than that it is something that allows an inference to the existence of something else.”
68 This would have to be modiﬁed to account for divine causation, since Kant thinks that created
things are not mere accidents (contra Spinoza). Watkins (2004), ch.4, outlines Kant’s model of
causation.
69 MH, 28:27; MVol, 28:434, 512, 515; MvS, 28:640; MMron, 29: 796, 823–4. 70 Meta. §197.
71 MH, 28:25–26, 129; ML1, 28:261; MVol, 28:431; MvS, 28:511; MMron, 29:770, 833.
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existence of an accident is not a force, and does not possess a force, but at
most a capacity (Vermögen). In order for an accident to actually exist in
a substance, a ground of its real possibility (the capacity of that substance to
receive the alteration) and a ground of its actual existence (a force) must be
present. To relate this to a previous distinction, this means that a capacity is
a partial/insufﬁcient ground of the existence of an accident; the complete/
sufﬁcient ground of the accident would be the activation of that capacity,
the force (Kraft). Causal grounds can be subordinated to one another, in
which case the cause of a given effect is itself the effect of a further cause,
and so on.72 Or causal grounds can be coordinated, as when multiple
substances cooperate to produce a given effect; in this case, the causes are
said to “concur.”73
Kant’s doctrine that grounds must be complete/sufﬁcient has the effect
of “ﬂattening out” things’ causal roles: None of the proper parts of the
complete cause are causes full stop. But our actual talk of causes is more
ﬁne-grained than that; when we are asked for the cause of a given effect, we
typically cite something that, by itself, is not sufﬁcient to bring about the
effect.We typically cite an incomplete/insufﬁcient cause. A series of further
distinctions Kant makes within efﬁcient causation are intended, I take it, to
restore some of that ﬁne-grained structure. Within the insufﬁcient causes
that make up a complete cause, Kant distinguishes the “principal cause”
and the “auxiliary cause.”74 To use Kant’s example in Metaphysik L2, the
principal cause of the ﬁring of a cannonball is the soldier who ignites the
cannon, and the auxiliary cause is the gunpowder.75 Obviously, without
the gunpowder the cannonball would not have been ﬁred (Kant calls it
a condition sine qua non), but we are supposed to share the intuition that
the soldier is more causally relevant to the cannonball ﬁring than the
powder, a mere instrument by which the soldier affected the cannonball.
However, Kant gives us no principled reason for distinguishing the princi-
pal cause (the soldier) from the merely auxiliary cause (the gunpowder).
More interestingly, given the role that space and time play in making
causal relations possible in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant considers the
causal role of the spatiotemporal circumstances (Umstand, circumstantia)
72 MMron, 29:844–5. Given the model of causation I have outlined, this needs to be spelled out more
precisely, as follows: substance s1 can cause an accident a in substance s2, which, partly in virtue of
being modiﬁed by a, can cause accident a* in substance s3. Thanks to Damian Melamedoff for
pressing me on this point.
73 ML1, 28:347; ML2, 28:571–2; MDoh, 28:648–9); MK3, 29:1014–15; MK2, 28:719, 811.
74 MH, 28:38; ML2, 28: 572–3; MMron, 29:845; MDoh, 28:648. Cf. M, §320.
75 ML2, 28: 572–3.
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of a given causal nexus.76 In the context of Kant’s distinction between
principal and auxiliary cause, I take this to be a recognition that, in space
and time, no cause is a complete/sufﬁcient cause unless we hold ﬁxed the
spatiotemporal relation to its effect. The very same cause, in a different
spatiotemporal relation to the substance in which its effect inheres, would
produce a different effect. For instance, to recall Kant’s example of the
stove and the heated room (A202/B248), if the stove were not in the room
but directly outside it, or if the room were bigger, or the stove were heated
for a while and then extinguished, the temperature of the room would be
different. But if we take seriously the idea that a complete ground is
sufﬁcient to bring about the effect, and a complete ground is a substance
and thus cannot be a set of spatiotemporal relations (which, being mod-
iﬁcations of forms of intuition, cannot be substantial), it seems that Kant’s
Critical model of causation needs to be amended from a simple substance-
accident model to a more complex substance-spatiotemporal circumstance-
accident model. Developing such a model lies outside the scope of this
chapter, though.
V. Non-causal Real Grounds
All causes are real grounds, but in some lecture transcripts Kant appears to
go further and identify real grounds as such with causes. For instance, in
the Volckmann transcripts he says: “That which contains the real ground of
a consequence is called ‘cause’”(MVol, 28:403).77 In this section, I will
argue that this cannot represent his considered view, for he is committed,
both implicitly and explicitly, to the existence of real grounds that are not
causal grounds.
(a) Pre-Critical
It is clear that in the pre-Critical system of the early 1760s Kant is
committed to there being conceptual space between real grounding and
causation.78 In BDG, Kant distinguishes between the “logical” and the
“material” elements of possibility. The logical requirement on possibility is
that a possible predicate be internally logically consistent (i.e. that it not
contain both A and ~A as marks). Logical consistency on its own is not
sufﬁcient for possibility: If a predicate is possible, then there must exist
76 ML2, 28:573; MDoh, 28:649; MMron, 29:845. Cf. M, §323. 77 Cf. MH, 28:37, 102.
78 I borrow the idea of a pre-critical system of the 1760s from Henrich (1967).
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a real ground of its possibility.79 While Kant does not use the terminology
of “real” and “logical” possibility in the BDG itself, we can borrow that
later, Critical terminology, and express Kant’s view as follows: Real possi-
bility requires a real ground, while logical consistency is sufﬁcient for
logical possibility.80 In BDG, Kant also offers an elaborate argument that
there is a unique, simple and real ground of all (real) possibility, which is
(or possesses) a mind. Kant identiﬁes this mind that grounds all real
possibility as God.81 While Kant never unambiguously states the nature
of the real grounding relation between God and real possibility, it is clear
that it is not a relation of causal grounding.82
The BDG idea that God is the real, but non-causal, ground of the
material element of all possibility is found throughout the contempora-
neous Herder transcripts.83 It is also found in Metaphysik Volckmann, the
very lectures in which Kant appears to equate real grounds with causes, as
well as many other sets of lectures from the Critical period.84 I think that
this is sufﬁcient reason to dismiss that passage (and a pair of others85) as
either mistaken transcriptions or slips on Kant’s part. His consistent view is
that not all real grounds are causes.
Intriguingly, during the Critical period, Kant appears to continue to
endorse, at least in lectures, the pre-Critical view that God is the unique
real ground of all real possibility. In Pölitz Religion Lectures Kant writes:
On this point rests the only possible ground of proof for my demonstration
of God’s existence, which was discussed in detail in a work I published some
years ago. Here it was shown that of all possible proofs, the one which
affords us the most satisfaction is the argument that if we remove an original
being, we at the same time remove the substratum of the possibility of all
things. – But even this proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot
establish the objective necessity of an original being, but establishes only
the subjective necessity of assuming [annehmen] such a being. But this proof
can in no way be refuted, because it has its ground in the nature of human
reason. For my reason makes it absolutely necessary for me to assume
a being which is the ground of everything possible, because otherwise
79 BDG, 2:77–8.
80 Although “real possibility” (reale Möglichkeit) does not appear in BDG, it does appear in R, 4196,
17:452, which Adickes dates to 1769–70.
81 This argument, in rather condensed form, is found at BDG, 2:82–9.
82 That God is a real ground of (real) possibility is clear from BDG, 2:79, 82–5, 88. That God is not the
cause of (real) possibility is clear from Kant’s rejection of the Cartesian view of possibility; see BDG,
2:91, 100, and the nearly contemporary MH, 28:134. There is now an extensive critical literature on
these issues in BDG; see especially Chignell (2009), Abaci (2014) and Stang (2016).
83 MH, 28: 128, 132–4, and 150.
84 MH, 28:457. See also MDoh, 28:692; MK2, 28:779, 781–2, 796. 85 See note 74 above.
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I would be unable to know what in general the possibility of something
consists in [worin etwas möglich sey]. (RelPö, 28:1034)
The status Kant now claims for this proof is no longer that of an
objectively valid deduction, but a subjectively valid rational requirement.
Nonetheless, that this proof remains even prima facie conceptually coher-
ent to Kant in the mid-1780s86 means that he does not identify the
concept <real ground> with <cause>, for in the very same period he
frequently distinguishes between causes as grounds of becoming (ratio
ﬁendi) and non-causal grounds of being (ratio essendi).87 God, the ground
of all real possibility, cannot be a ratio ﬁendi of possibility because
possibilities do not “become” (they do not go from being impossible to
possible in time). If there is a God, he must therefore be the ratio essendi
of real possibility, a non-causal real ground.
(b) Critical
I am now going to give some examples of real grounding relations within
Kant’s Critical system that are non-causal. In some cases, these are expli-
citly characterized by Kant as non-causal real grounds; in other cases, it is
a consequence of Kant’s larger views that these are real grounds but not
causes, but he does not state this explicitly.
Space and Time. Space is a ground of spaces, that is, determinate and
bounded subregions of the whole space.88 Space is not a cause of those
spaces, because space is not a causally efﬁcacious substance, but a mere
form. However, the relation between space and spaces is not a conceptual
one. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that spaces are not
related to space as marks to a concept, because a concept cannot contain
inﬁnitely many marks.89 Recall that the relation between concept A and
concept B is a logical grounding relation just in case B is a mark of A; it
would be a violation of the PNC if something instantiated A but not
B (because B is a mark of A), so the positing relation between A and B can
be explained solely through the PNC. Since spaces are not marks of space
(or <space>), the positing relation between space and spaces (if there is
space, there are spaces) is not the relation of a concept to its marks and
cannot be explained through the PNC. By deﬁnition, then, space is a real
86 Kant lectured on rational theology during the winter semesters of 1783–4 and 1785–6; it is unclear
which series of lectures is the basis of the Pölitz transcripts. See Kant (1996, pp. 337–8) for more.
87 See the texts cited in section III.e. 88 A25/B39. Cf. R, 4319, 17:504; MvS, 28:483. 89 B40.
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non-logical ground of the inﬁnitely many spaces contained in it. Parallel
reasoning shows that time is the non-causal real ground of times (temporal
intervals with non-zero duration).90 One might also wonder whether there
are grounding relations between spaces (or times); various remarks Kant
makes suggest that there are.91 Such a grounding relation would have to
obey the structural principles of grounding überhaupt: (a) irreﬂexivity, (b)
transitivity and (c) asymmetry. One spatial relation that has these struc-
tural features is proper inclusion, the relation one region R bears to a region
R* when R is wholly enclosed within R* but is not identical to R*.Whether
Kant in fact thinks a region of space grounds the spaces wholly included
within it, I will not attempt to determine here.92
Space is not only the ground of spaces but also a ground of the possibility
of the objects in space (appearances).93 There could not be objects in space
without space, but we represent space without representing objects in it.94
There is an asymmetric order of explanation here: Space makes objects
possible, not vice versa. Likewise, time asymmetrically explains the possi-
bility of objects in time (that is, inner states).
Mathematical objects. In the contemporary literature on grounding, one
of the principal sources of “intuition pumps” that are supposed to convince
readers of the existence of non-causal, non-logical metaphysical explana-
tion relations has been mathematical examples in which, intuitively, one
mathematical truth asymmetrically explains another, even though, both
being necessary, they necessarily entail one another.95 Interestingly, Kant
uses a similar example:
Ratio essendi is the ground of that which belongs to a thing according to its
possibility, e.g., the three sides in the triangle are the ground of the three
corners. (MMron, 29:809)
What contains the ground of something is called the principium. The cause
is that which contains the ground of the actuality of the determination or
the substance. The three lines in a triangle are the ground, but not the cause.
(ML2, 28:571)96
Kant is making the intuitive point that the trilaterality of the triangle (the
fact that it has three sides) explains its triangularity (the fact that it has
three angles) and not vice versa. In theMetaphysik Mrongovius, he points
90 Cf. A32/B47–8. 91 MMron, 29:880. 92 Parallel issues arise for time, of course.
93 A24/B38–9, A28/B44, B202. Cf. R, 4119, 17:424; R, 6290, 18:558; MDoh 28:653; MMron, 29:832.
94 A24/B38–9. 95 The locus classicus being Fine (1994).
96 It is possible that these are transcriptions of the same lecture, but, according to Ameriks’s and
Naragon’s Introduction to Kant (1997), this is unlikely.
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out that the triangle’s trilaterality does not cause it to have three angles,
for we are talking about the triangle merely qua object of a possible
construction (which has no causal powers) rather than as the ink-and-
paper illustration (which does). What’s more, on Kant’s own view of
geometry, this is not a logical-grounding claim: One cannot prove that
any three-sided plane ﬁgure has three angles merely by using the PNC;
one must use geometric construction, which introduces an irreducibly
non-logical (because intuitional) element. Consequently, Kant is com-
mitted to the trilaterality of the triangle being a non-causal real ground of
its triangularity.
Unity of apperception. In passages in both editions of the Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant makes an analogy between space and time as grounds of
the possibility of objects in space and time and the unity of apperception as
the ground of the possibility of cognition of those objects:
The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, accord-
ing to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility
stands under the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme prin-
ciple of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold
of intuition stands under conditions of the original synthetic unity of
apperception. (B136)
[T]he numerical unity of this apperception grounds all concepts a priori
just as the manifoldness of space and time grounds the intuitions of
sensibility. (A107)
If we take seriously the grounding relation between space and objects
of intuition, and if we take seriously Kant’s analogy, it follows that
the unity of apperception is a ground of the possibility of the objects
of cognition. The unity of apperception is not a logical ground of the
possibility of objects of cognition, for we cannot cognize the possibi-
lity of objects of cognition solely by analyzing the concept <unity of
apperception> into its marks; but neither is the unity of apperception
a cause of the objects of experience. This entails that the unity of
apperception is a real non-causal ground of the possibility of objects
of cognition.
Principles of experience.97 In fact, the doctrine of real non-causal
grounds lies at the very center of Kant’s whole critical enterprise.
Consider one of the most frequently occurring phrases in the whole
Critique of Pure Reason: x is said to “a priori ground” (a priori gründen)
97 My thinking in this section is deeply indebted to Smit (2009).
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or to be the “a priori ground” or “ground of possibility” of y.98 For instance,
one of the central doctrines of the ﬁrst Critique is that the principles of
experience are a priori grounds of the possibility of experience. One might
be tempted to read “a priori grounds” in this idiom purely epistemically:
x is a ground of knowing y independently of experience. But in the context
of Kant’s lectures and other eighteenth-century theories of ground, it is
reasonable to read Kant as making the stronger claim that the principles of
experience are explanatory grounds of the possibility of experience. Thus,
these grounding relations entail the possibility of a priori knowledge, but
understood in its traditional meaning as: knowledge from the grounds.99
In knowing objects of experience from the principles of experience we
know possible objects of experience from the very grounds that make them
possible. This also casts new light on Kant’s frequent use of “principle”
(Grundsatz, Prinzip) in the Critique of Pure Reason, for Kant repeatedly
equates principles with grounds in his lectures,100 and he begins the System
of Principles by writing: “A priori principles bear this name because they
contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but also because
they are not themselves grounded in higher and more general cognitions”
(A148/B188). The principles of experience are not merely among the
grounds of the possibility of experience; they are among the ultimate ﬁrst
grounds of the possibility of experience.101
In fact, Kant explicitly draws this connection between his Critical
project and the traditional German rationalist conception of ground in
his lectures. Metaphysik Mrongovius begins with Kant saying:
We consider here (in metaphysics) not things as they are connected as
grounds and consequences, but rather cognitions. [. . .] I can imagine
a cognition that is not a consequence, thus the highest ground, and [one]
that is not a ground, thus the last consequence. [. . .]We thus have an idea of
a connection of cognitions as grounds and consequences. Cognitions which
are the grounds of grounds that follow a certain rule are called principia.
Thus, insofar as cognitions are in a series, there must also be principia. [. . .]
If I begin from the consequences, then I cognize something a posteriori; if
98 B14, A24–5, A31/B47, A87/B120, A94/B126, A113, A118, B151, A160/B199, A218n/B265n, A237/B296,
A262/B319, A306/B362, A353, A401, A562/B590, A564/B592.
99 For the traditional meaning of a priori knowledge, see MMron, 29:748.
100 Most notably, MVol, 28:355–6 and MMron, 29:747–9. Given the similarity of these two passages,
they may constitute different transcriptions of the same lectures.
101 More precisely, they terminate the grounding chain constituted by judgments. As Kant goes on to
make clear in the next paragraph, they are themselves grounded by intuition (space and time) and
understanding (unity of apperception). A complete treatment of the grounding structure of Kant’s
system would have to separate all of these grounding relations.
A Guide to Ground in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics 99
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/14765165/WORKINGFOLDER/FUGATE/9781107176980C04.3D 100 [74–101] 24.9.2018
6:37PM
I begin from the grounds, then I cognize a priori. (MMron, 29:748; Kant
1997102)
What Kant here calls “metaphysics” corresponds more closely to what the
ﬁrst Critique calls “transcendental philosophy”: uncovering the ﬁrst prin-
ciples of cognition that make all other cognitions possible. This is a priori
cognition, not (merely) in the sense of being justiﬁed independently of
experience, but in the sense of cognition from the ground; we come to
cognize why all other cognitions (including experiential ones) are possible.
In the very same passage, Kant endorses Baumgarten’s deﬁnition of meta-
physics as “the science of the ﬁrst principles of human cognition, which
thus contains the ﬁrst member of the series” (MMron, 29:749).While Kant
understands this formula in a very different way than Baumgarten himself
does, this should not obscure a structural similarity: Metaphysics – more
precisely, transcendental philosophy – uncovers principles, that is, the
highest or ﬁrst grounds.
I take it to be clear in this context that the grounding relation that Kant
has in mind is neither causal nor logical. The ﬁrst grounds of human
cognition are not causes of experience, but non-causal grounds that make
that cognition possible. Nor are they logical; for the ﬁrst grounds of human
cognition, in their deﬁnitive presentation in the Critique of Pure Reason, do
not constitute some concept whose marks are lower-level grounded cogni-
tions and experience itself. Instead, this relation is an instance of what, as
I have been arguing throughout this section, Kant retains within the
Critical system: non-causal real grounds.
Let me conclude by warning against assimilating the grounding relation
Kant discusses in the opening pages of both the Mrongovius and the
Volckmann transcripts to a merely epistemic relation. Kant stresses that the
consequence can be the ground of (a posteriori) knowledge of the principles
(grounds), and, vice versa, that the principles are grounds of (a priori)
knowledge of the consequences.103 The bare epistemic grounding relation
(being a ground of knowledge) is therefore not ﬁne-grained enough to
distinguish ground from consequence. Kant’s notions of “ground” and
“consequence” here must therefore be explanatory. Nonetheless, this expla-
natory, non-logical, non-causal real grounding relation is “epistemic” to the
extent that it holds between cognitions not things, as Kant emphasizes (see the
underlined sentence in the passage quoted above). But to say this is not to
deprive Kant’s discussion here of grounding of any “metaphysical” import
102 Cf. MVol, 28:355–6. 103 MMron, 29:748. Cf. MVol, 28:356.
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whatsoever. Recall a key principle of the possibility of synthetic a priori
judgments in the ﬁrst Critique: “The conditions of the possibility of experi-
ence in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the
objects of experience” (A158/B197). Grounds of cognition are at the same
time grounds of the objects of cognition.104
104 I would like to thank Ian Drummond for some truly excellent (and last-minute) copy-editing on
this paper. Thanks also to Damian Melamedoff for truly perceptive and helpful comments. I have
learned a great deal from Damian on all matters relating to ground in Kant and German
rationalism.
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